In this paper I intend to discuss Plotinus' view of quality, because, I believe, it would shed some light on Plotinus' ontology and on the relation between sensible and intelligible world, most especially. , where Plotinus speaks about quality in some detail, he is guided by his polemics against Aristotle, or, if this is his personal position on the matter, how it squares with his earlier position.
I
In this paper I intend to discuss Plotinus' view of quality, because, I believe, it would shed some light on Plotinus' ontology and on the relation between sensible and intelligible world, most especially. Plotinus discusses quality in Enn. II.6 [17] , a short, dialectical, and obscure treatise, and then in Enn. , where Plotinus speaks about quality in some detail, he is guided by his polemics against Aristotle, or, if this is his personal position on the matter, how it squares with his earlier position.
I will try to show that Plotinus does have a coherent theory about quality which is considerably different from that of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, and is quite distinct in the history of philosophy. Plato in the Theaetetus (182 b) was the fi rst to introduce the term 'quality', with the caution that this is a strange term, to signify what is affected ( ) in a certain way by an active cause ( ). 1 Aristotle on the other hand * I have greatly benefi ted from a set of critical remarks by Riccardo Chiaradonna and from discussions I had with Pavlos Kalligas, who answered several of my questions also by making available to me his unpublished paper 'The Structure of appearances. Plotinus's doctrine of the constitution of sensible objects'. Yet neither of them is responsible for any shortcomings of my paper.
1 See Burnyeat (1990) 311-312. in the Categories groups quality with the kinds of predicates which are in a subject, as opposed to substance ( ) which can never be in a subject (Cat. 2 1 a 20 ff.; 4 1 b 26; 5 3 a 7-21) and later on in the Metaphysics (V.14 1020 a 33-1021 b 25) he distinguishes between essential and accidental qualities, that is, between features qualifying the genus to which something belongs (e.g. man being a rational animal) and features qualifying the individual substance (e.g. Socrates being white), which count as accidents (cf. Met. VII.6 1031 b 22-28). Finally, the Stoics conceive of qualities as being corporeal, inseparable from the body they qualify. Plotinus' understanding of quality is, as we would expect, inspired by Plato, but it is also very much infl uenced by Aristotle's relevant views. The result is, as often with Plotinus, a highly personal doctrine about quality. Plotinus appears to believe that all features of sensible entities are nothing but qualities. He strongly opposes Aristotle's mature view (Met. VII esp. 8, 17) according to which the immanent Form ( ), such as the Form of man in Socrates, is substance on the grounds that this is the cause of something being what it is.
3 In Plotinus' view immanent Form is by no means the cause of something being what it is, but one quality among others of a sensible entity ( / ). That is, for Plotinus a big, white man has the qualities of bigness, whiteness, and humanity.
Such a view has its origins in Plato, yet urges an investigation into the sense in which Plotinus uses the term 'quality', because we would like to know why Plotinus takes the view that a sensible entity, e.g. a man, is considered not as being a man, that is, a substance, but as having the quality of a man, which turns out to be like all other qualities a man can have, such as big, white, or smart. To answer that, we fi rst need to understand how Plotinus conceives of substance, because it is this that guides him to conceive of immanent Form as quality. 4 Plotinus, we know, takes over from Plato the distinction between Forms which are immanent in matter, that is, in sensible entities, and transcendent Forms, which exist only in the intelligible realm, arguing that only the latter qualify as substance ( ). One reason why Plotinus argues this is because he, following Plato, believes that only
